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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a young couple in the not-too-distant-future who are
eagerly awaiting the birth of their first child. During the eighteenth
week of the pregnancy, the mother has an ultrasound performed to
detect possible developmental problems with the child. To their
dismay, the ultrasound reveals a malformation in the fetus. The defect
will not be fatal, but if left untreated will cause the child severe
breathing problems once born. The problem can be fixed with surgery
after birth, but such a procedure will result in disfiguring facial scars.
After thoroughly considering their options, which range from
an abortion to carrying the pregnancy to a natural delivery, the couple
decides to have a surgeon attempt to correct the defect while the fetus
remains in the womb. If successful, this fetal surgery will fix the
breathing problem without significant scarring.
The woman is
anesthetized, and the surgeon makes a small incision in her uterus to
expose the fetus and attempts to correct the problem. Unfortunately,
the surgery does not have the results intended. While in the recovery
room, the woman begins to experience labor pains and eventually
delivers a stillborn fetus.
Distraught over their loss, the woman and her husband visit a
lawyer with the intention of suing the hospital for the wrongful death
of their unborn child. Whether their suit has any chance of success
depends, in most states, on whether the fetus was of the age where it
would have been able to survive outside of the womb.
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This Note will argue that the viability limitation on wrongful
death recovery, which has been previously criticized as arbitrary and
unjust, is particularly inappropriate in the fetal surgery context.
While conceding that the viability standard is generally the most
prudent approach when a fetal death results from another's
negligence, it argues that problems with allowing recovery for
nonviable fetuses are not present when the cause of the death has
been a negligent fetal surgery. This Note concludes that States should
retain the viability standard as the general rule but should allow
parents of non-viable fetuses to sue in wrongful death when the
termination of the fetus has resulted from fetal surgery.
Part II of this Note discusses the brief history and rapidly
developing future of fetal surgery. Part III predicts how the current
medical malpractice law would apply to fetal surgery, explaining that
the recognition of a legal duty of care from the surgeon to the fetus
would not mean that the surgeon would be liable every time a fetal
surgery results in a miscarriage or stillbirth.1 Parts IV and V trace
the evolution of the cause of action for wrongful death in AngloAmerican law, both in general and as applied to the unborn. Part VI
presents the reasons given by judges and scholars for adhering to the
viability standard. Part VII offers a policy-based argument for a
special standard in wrongful death cases involving fetal surgeries.
Part VIII argues that the reasons presented in Part VI are either not
applicable in the fetal surgery context or based on false premises
altogether.
II. BACKGROUND ON FETAL SURGERY
Few possibilities are as terrifying to expectant parents as the
prospect that their child will not be born healthy. Yet, despite great
gains in the field of obstetric health, the risk that an American child
will be born with a major birth defect remains significant. 2 Until
recently, those parents whose prenatal care revealed that their unborn
child suffered from a major birth defect were forced to choose between
1.
Pregnancies that spontaneously terminate early in the pregnancy are called
miscarriages or abortions. BERNARD S. MALOY, THE SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR
LAWYERS 331 (1942). To avoid confusion between spontaneous and physician induced abortions,
I will avoid using the term abortion to describe the unintended termination of a pregnancy.
Pregnancies that spontaneously terminate when the child is close to term are usually called
stillbirths. Id. at 418.
2.
A study conducted in one major American city revealed a major birth defect rate of
3.3%. Nat'l Ctr. on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities, Ctrs. for Disease Control, U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 2002 Report on the Metropolitan Atlanta Congenital Defect
Program 6 (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbdddfbd/documents/MACDP2002.pdf.
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abortion and the prospect of waiting until after birth to treat the
defect, knowing that in many cases it would worsen as the child
continued to develop. 3 Medical science finally began to offer a third
choice in 1981, when surgeons at the University of California, San
Francisco performed the first successful intrauterine surgery on a
fetus. 4 Instead of waiting until after birth, the doctors tried to correct
the defect in the midst of the pregnancy.
Since 1981, pioneering surgeons at a few hospitals across the
United States have used fetal surgery techniques to treat a variety of
defects that would otherwise be fatal to the unborn child. 5 While
these techniques are quite diverse, they fall into two major categories.
The older and more intrusive category, commonly referred to as open
fetal surgery, involves surgically opening the uterus, just as in a
caesarian section, and performing the procedure directly on the fetus. 6
In this procedure, the fetus is actually partially out of the womb for a
time and exposed to the open air. 7 The second category is the
endoscopic procedure, in which the surgeon inserts a single needle into
the uterus.8 While endoscopic procedures are less traumatic than
open surgeries, both procedures are fraught with significant dangers
for both mother and child. 9

3.
For instance, a common birth defect in male fetuses is an obstruction in the urinary
tract.
The Fetal Treatment Ctr., Univ. of Cal. San Francisco, Urinary Obstructions,
http://www.fetalsurgery.ucsf.edu/irinary.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). "When both kidneys
are obstructed and unable to empty, the pressure builds up in the kidney and destroys the tissue.
Cysts often form as a result of the pressure build up; the cysts replace normal functioning kidney
tissue. Amniotic fluid (fetal urine) is crucial in the development of the fetal lungs. If there is not
enough amniotic fluid, the lungs of the fetus do not grow. As a result, fetal urinary tract
obstruction can produce pulmonary hypoplasia (small lungs) and renal dysplasia (destruction of
the kidneys)." Id.
4.
MONICA J. CASPER, THE MAKING OF THE UNBORN PATIENT: A SOCIAL ANATOMY OF FETAL
SURGERY 5 (1998).
5.
Among the fetal defects that are currently treated with some sort of fetal intervention
are Congenital Cystic Adenomatoid Malformation of the Lung (CCAM), Spina Bifida,
Sacrococcygeal Teratoma (SCT), Lower Urinary Tract Obstruction (LUTO), and Congenital
Diaphragmatic Hernia (CDH). STEVEN G. GABBE ET AL., OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM
PREGNANCIES 297-305 (4th ed. 2002)
6.
The Fetal Treatment Ctr., Univ. of Cal. San Francisco, Congenital Cystic Adenomatoid
Malformation of the Lung (CCAM), How We Treat It, http://www.fetalsurgery.ucsf.educcam.htm
(last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
7.
Id.
8.
The Fetal Treatment Ctr., Univ. of Cal. San Francisco, Twin Diseases, How We Treat It,
http://www.fetalsurgery.ucsf.edu/twindiseases.htm (lastvisited Sept. 23, 2003).
9.
Susan Okie, Over the Tiniest Patients, Big Ethical Questions: Fetal Surgery's Growing
Reach Raises Issues of Need and Risks, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2000, at A01 ("Women can
experience bleeding, infection and sometimes life-threatening side effects from drugs to control
premature labor. They must have all future children by caesarian section. And virtually all
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Until the late 1990s the risks of fetal surgery were thought so
severe that the procedure was only attempted when the defect was
likely to cause the death of the fetus if left untreated. 10 But, in the
past several years a few surgeons have begun performing fetal
surgeries to ameliorate the effects of spina bifida, a disease which,
though debilitating, is generally not fatal." These new procedures
have caused great controversy, since an operation on a fetus that
would likely survive its defect without surgery raises, for the first
time, the possibility that the surgery could cause more harm than
good. 12
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO FETAL SURGERY
Many of the ethical and legal issues that fetal surgery raises
have been examined at length. Commentators have explored the
ethical responsibilities of the doctor when the health interests of fetus
and mother conflict, 13 the moral threat to abortion rights presented by
surgeries that benefit nonviable fetuses, 14 the possibility that the
government could compel a pregnant woman to undergo surgery to
benefit her unborn child, 15 and whether pregnant women are being
given adequate information on the risks to their own health that arise
infants who have fetal surgery are born prematurely, increasing their chances of complications
as newborns.").
10. CASPER, supra note 4, at 6; Okie, supra note 9.
11. Fetal-surgery.com, http://www.fetal-surgery.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). Four
hospitals currently use fetal surgery to treat spina bifida: Vanderbilt University Medical Center
(VUMC) in Nashville, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP), the University of California
in San Francisco (UCSF), and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC). Id. Of
these hospitals, only UCSF uses the endoscopic method, rather than the more intrusive open
surgery method. Id.
12. Okie, supra note 9 ("This is a real jump for us, to go from a baby who's... guaranteed
to die' without fetal surgery to one who doesn't need it to survive, said Lori Howell, coordinator of
CHOP's fetal surgery program."); see also CASPER, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that "[tihe
prevailing logic [behind earlier surgeries was] that these fetuses will die anyway and thus make
perfect candidates for a new and uncertain treatment"); Tami Jackson, Surgery in Womb Fuels
'Start of Life' Debate-And Sparks Others ("The shift from lethal to non-lethal anomalies raises
the moral presence of the fetus in a way that we need to think through more carefully." (quoting
Mark Bliton) "One could argue that we are turning a malformation that doesn't cause death into
one that might." (quoting Dr. Noel Tulipan)), at http://cronkite.pp.asu.edu/med/Pages/jack-womb
.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
13. CASPER, supra note 4, at 170-73.
14. See Bill Snyder, The Picture that Went 'Round the World, THE TENNESSEAN, Jan. 9,
2000, at 11A (discussing how the abortion controversy has been enflamed by the publication of
photos taken during open uterus fetal surgeries that show the human features of a nonviable
fetus).
15. E.g., Krista L. Newkirk, State-Compelled Fetal Surgery: The Viability Test Is Not
Viable, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 467 (1998).; Katherine A. Knopoff, Note, Can a Pregnant
Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CAL.. L. REV. 499 (1991).
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in a fetal surgery. 16 One issue left unexplored, however, is whether
the fetal surgeon owes any special legal duty to the only patient whom
he endeavors to benefit: the fetus.
This Note is primarily concerned with the extent to which fetal
surgeons owe a duty of care to the fetuses upon which they operate.
However, even if fetal surgeons owed the same duty to an unborn
patient as they do to a newborn child, a fetal surgeon would not be
automatically liable if the fetus were lost after a fetal surgery.
Surgeons can only be held liable for negligence when (1) they have a
duty of care to a particular individual, (2) they breach that duty of
care, and (3) there is a causal relationship between the breach and an
17
injury to that individual.
Generally, a breach of the duty of care is established when a
person fails to exercise the amount of care that would be exercised by
Medical
a reasonable person under similar circumstances.' 8
malpractice cases differ from normal tort cases in that the standard of
care is established not by what a reasonable person would do, but by
the level of care that would customarily be provided by a doctor in the
same general line of practice and geographic area. 19 With newly
developed procedures such as fetal surgery, establishing breach
becomes difficult, if not impossible, because there is essentially no
20
standard of care to which a particular procedure can be compared.
Even if the plaintiff in a fetal surgery case could prove a breach by the
surgeon, the plaintiff would still have difficulty proving the necessary
element of causation. When new surgical techniques are applied to
patients who already have serious health problems, courts are
21
reluctant to find that the surgery caused the patient's death.

16.
17.

CASPER, supra note 4, at 154-57.
See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES,

AND QUESTIONS 992 (2d ed. 1998) (listing the propositions a plaintiff must prove to win a medical
malpractice lawsuit).
18. Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558
(1959).
19. Id. at 558-59.
20. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382,
1391 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of establishing a customary standard of care when new
technologies are constantly adjusting the standard). Of course, this protection only applies to the
new aspects of a new procedure. A surgeon that failed to count his sponges during a fetal
surgery might still be liable if a sponge was left inside the patient, because sponges must be
counted in every surgery.
21. E.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 422 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that relatives of a man
with a critical heart condition who died during an experimental heart surgery did not meet the
burden of proving causation when "expert testimony at best links the mechanical heart as only
one of the 'possible' but less likely causes of... death").
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Given that the plaintiff in a fetal surgery wrongful death case
could only rarely establish breach and causation, today's fetal
surgeons would most likely avoid any liability even if courts
recognized that surgeons owe a duty to fetuses. Nonetheless, the risk
of liability, and the attendant large jury award, would likely convince
22
fetal surgeons and their insurance companies to settle such cases.
To avoid this result, legislatures should fix the amount of damages
allowed in fetal surgery wrongful death cases. Since every parent
whose fetus dies after a fetal surgery has experienced approximately
the same loss, 23 the legislature should be able to establish a monetary
value for that loss. 24 While this amount should not be nominal, it also
should not be so large that plaintiffs can use it to extract in terrorem
25
settlements.
As a policy matter, it seems appropriate that plaintiffs should
have a difficult time holding surgeons liable for any injury that results
from surgery on a fetus. The few surgeons who are currently
performing these procedures provide a ray of hope to parents who
would otherwise have little. To overburden these pioneering surgeons
with the prospect of defending innumerable and potentially frivolous
lawsuits at this early stage would discourage further innovation and
26
punish those who seek to move the practice of medicine forward.
Since the difficulty of proving breach and causation should be
adequate to keep innovating fetal surgeons out of the courthouse for
now, concluding that the surgeon owes a duty to a fetus will not
22. Conversely, a rule of law stating that no duty is owed to a fetus means that a defendant
can win his case without appealing to a jury. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 236 (5th ed. 1984) ("A decision by the court that, upon any version of the
facts, there is no duty, must necessarily result in judgment for the defendant.").
23. Each parent that brings this suit has lost a potential child. Some plaintiffs will feel the
loss of their fetus more strongly than others. However, in the fetal surgery context, we know
that each plaintiff valued its fetus enough to undergo a painful and risky surgery on behalf of the
fetus, but probably did not value its fetus as much as if the fetus had been born. Even if the set
amount is not the perfect compensation in every case, the similarities in circumstances of each
plaintiff ensures that a set amount that is fair for the average plaintiff will be substantially fair
for the rest.
24. It is, of course, quite difficult to put a monetary value on any life or potential life. But,
to disallow recovery altogether because the estimation of damages is difficult brings the same
result as deciding that the life or potential life has no value.
25. There is some precedent for a system like this. Florida and Virginia have both created
no-fault compensation schemes for babies that are delivered alive but with serious injuries.
Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 53, 82-83 (1998). While the amount of compensation in the scheme varies from case
to case, the compensation is determined by an administrative agency according to specific
factors. Id. at 85-87. Florida's system provides for non-pecuniary losses up to $100,000. Id. at
91.
26. See Robert D. Mulford, Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99
(1967) (discussing the need to balance innovation in medicine with the rights of patients).
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immediately lead to an undesirable increase in medical malpractice
cases. Therefore, recognizing this duty is presently a solution without
a problem. The question of the fetal surgeon's duty to the fetus is not
merely academic, however, because the tendency of medical
technology is to advance, and that means that fetal surgery will not
remain an extraordinary remedy forever. At some point the in utero
27
correction of birth defects will become a standard procedure.
Further, just as fetal surgeons have recently moved from treating only
lethal defects to treating those which are debilitating but not lethal,
fetal surgery will likely move toward treating even less traumatic
defects in the future. 28 For instance, since fetal tissue has not yet
developed the ability to scar, some have speculated that facial
29
deformities will eventually be treated through fetal surgery.
As fetal surgeries become more routine, they will no longer be
performed exclusively by the best surgeons in the most advanced
30
facilities. At the same time, parents will increasingly expect success.
By that time, the protections of breach and causation will begin to
erode 31 along with the policy reasons for protecting fetal surgeons from
malpractice liability. To be prepared, negligence law must now begin
to determine the extent of the surgeon's duty to her fetal patient.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
At common law, courts did not allow recovery when a person
injured by another's carelessness or intentional act died of his injuries
before bringing suit. 32 It was, therefore, cheaper for a tortfeasor to kill
his victim than to injure him. 33 The application of the doctrine also
27. Bonnie Steinbock, Maternal-FetalConflict and In Utero Therapy, 57 ALA. L. REV. 781,
788 (1994).
28. Okie, supra note 9.
29. CASPER, supra note 4, at 99-102 (describing the extraordinary discovery of the ability of
fetal tissue to heal without scarring).
30. See Jeffrey L. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient:Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J.L.
& MED. 1, 17 (1983) (noting that "[w]hen innovative fetal surgery procedures become beneficial
and safe, the parents will likely consent to-indeed expect-treatment that will save the life of the
future child or prevent a life of unnecessary deformity").
31. Breach will be easier to prove because as the surgery becomes more standard, a
standard of care will develop against which a physician's performance can be measured.
Causation will be easier to prove for two reasons. First, when fetal surgeries increasingly
involve patients who do not have life threatening birth defects, courts will be less likely to
assume that the cause of death was a preexisting problem with the pregnancy. Second, as fetal
surgery becomes more common, the medical community should begin to have a better sense of
the problems that fetal surgery is likely to cause.
32. Keeton et al., supra note 22, at 942.
33. Id.
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created an entire class of destitute families who, having lost their sole
breadwinner to the wrongful acts of another and being unable to bring
any suit for recovery, pulled on both the heartstrings and purse
34
strings of society.
In Great Britain, dissatisfaction with the strictness of the
common law culminated with Parliament's passage of Lord Campbell's
Act in 1846. 35 This first wrongful death statute provided that
[W]henever the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of
another, in such a manner as would have entitled the party injured to have sued had
death not ensued, an action may be maintained if brought within twelve months after
his death 6 in the name of his executor or administrator for the benefit of certain
3
relatives.

The principles embodied in Lord Campbell's Act were eventually
adopted in every American jurisdiction, always in the form of
37
statute.
While the American versions of Lord Campbell's Act agreed on
the principle that the dependents of a deceased should not be left
without any claim against the tortfeasor, the statutes parted company
on the legal theory that courts should pursue in vindicating this
principle. 38 Some statutes based liability on the losses suffered by the
dependents of the deceased; others simply maintained that the
dependents could maintain the action for injuries that the deceased
could have brought had he survived. 39 Though the majority of States
compensate for a dependent's loss, these differences in statutory
40
schemes remain today.
Jurisdictions adopting the former theory of liability have had
trouble deciding what type of compensation a decedent's dependents
should receive. 41
Wrongful death statutes were traditionally
interpreted to allow dependents to recover only the income that the
deceased would have earned. 42 Fear of speculative estimates caused
many jurisdictions to bar recovery for emotional damages suffered by

34.
273, 275
35.
36.

See T.A. Smedley, Some Order Out of Chaos in Wrongful Death Law, 37 VAND. L. REV.
(1984).
9 & 10 Vict., c. 93. (Eng.), cited in KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 945.
Id., quoted in Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing-In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A

Survey of North CarolinaLaw, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1995).

37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 945.
38. Smedley, supra note 34, at 275-76.
39. Id. These two theories are often differentiated by calling the former wrongful death and
the latter survival. Id.
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 946.
41. Smedley, supra note 34, at 277-79.
42. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 949.
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the deceased's family. 43 Courts in a few states softened the effect of
this rule by holding that, while the family members of the deceased
could not be allowed to recover for their "grief and anguish," it was
appropriate to consider "not only [the deceased's] earning capacity, but
also the care and attention which such a man would give to his wife
and children, and also the loss of his advice and training as a husband
and father . . ... 44 These noneconomic damages, which are generally
categorized under the description "loss of consortium," are now
45
allowed in the majority of jurisdictions.
Determining wrongful death damages has been even more
problematic when the plaintiffs are parents seeking recovery for the
death of their child. In virtually all such cases there will be no pure
economic damages since children do not bring more money into the
household than it costs to raise them. Courts in many jurisdictions
have responded to this problem by declaring that the relevant
standard is not the wages that the child might have earned had she
While a few
worked, but the value of her companionship. 46
jurisdictions require that the unrealized expenses of child rearing be
deducted from the loss of companionship award, 4 7 they are currently a
distinct minority. 48 While both controversial and unpredictable, jury
49
awards to the parents of deceased children can be quite high.
V. AVAILABILITY OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS FOR UNBORN
CHILDREN

Throughout history, courts have inconsistently allowed
compensation for injuries to fetuses. The wrongful death statutes
enacted by the States have traditionally given little guidance as to
whether unborn children should be included within the State's realm
of protection. 50 State courts have attempted to fill this void with a
43. Lanni P. Tama, Note, Recovery for Loss of Consortium in a Wrongful Death Action, 49
BROOK. L. REV. 605, 608 (1983).
44. Walker v. McNeill, 50 P. 518, 520 (Wash. 1897).
45. Tama, supra note 43, at 609.
46. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Mich. 1960) (distinguishing the lost value
of the child's companionship, which was recoverable, from the grief suffered by the parents,
which was not).
47. E.g., Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 17 (Iowa 1977).
48. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 953.
49. See, e.g., Turner v. Parish of Jefferson Through Dep't of Recreation, 721 So. 2d 64, 77
(La. Ct. App. 1998) (declaring that a judgment for $225,000 to the mother of a twelve-year-old
girl who drowned in a hotel swimming pool was appropriate when mother and daughter had a
close and loving relationship).
50. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (Michie 2003) ("Whenever the death of a person shall
be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, although such death shall have been
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series of bright-line rules delineating the point at which State
protection should begin. As will be seen, each rule led to some sort of
injustice when applied in unusual situations. Courts have vacillated
throughout the twentieth century, and the States currently remain at
odds with one another as to the extent to which tort law should treat a
fetus differently from a born child.
A. The Strict Common Law Standard
At common law, injuries sustained by a fetus while encased in
the womb, even if the fetus survived the injury and was born alive,
were not compensable; there was no recovery. This principle was most
famously enunciated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes during his
tenure on the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 5 1 Justice Holmes
reasoned that, since the fetus was "not yet in being," it could not be
owed a legal duty by a third party. 52 He also asserted that any
significant injury suffered by a fetus would necessarily be suffered by
the mother first, and her ability to recover would ensure adequate
53
justice.
For sixty years, Justice Holmes's statement of the law
survived. His assertions about the fetus's lack of legal personhood
were bolstered in subsequent years by a variety of policy arguments
put forth by courts concerned with the prospect of ever-expanding tort
liability.5 4 Determining pecuniary damages for the death of a child
became all the more problematic when the child had not yet been born

caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony, and the act, or neglect, or default,
is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the
corporation which, would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured." (emphasis added)); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (2003) ("When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or
default of another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action
for damages therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their
personal representatives or collectors, shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by
the personal representative or collector of the decedent." (emphasis added) ("Person" is not
defined by the statute.)). But see S.D. Codified Laws § 21-5-1 (2003) ("Whenever the death or
injury of a person, including an unborn child, shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereto, if death had not ensued, then and in
every such case, the corporation which, or the person who, would have been liable, if death had
not ensued, or the personal representative of the estate of such person as such personal
representative, shall be liable, to an action for damages." (emphasis added)).
51. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id.
54. Lenow, supra note 30, at 6.
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because the fact finder could not have any indication of an unborn
child's future earning capacity. 55 Further, in a time when a lack of
modern medical care meant that pregnancies frequently did not result
in healthy children, courts recognized that proof of causation between
an injury to the mother and injury to the fetus could rarely be
56
identified.
The strict rule barring recovery for any fetal injury was
increasingly called into question during the first half of the twentieth
century. 57 The most compelling case for change was presented
whenever a pregnant woman suffered a fatal injury, but her child,
albeit injured, could be delivered alive.5 8 Because the fetus survived
its injuries, the damage caused by the injury was just as easy to
evaluate as if the child had been injured shortly after birth. With the
mother dead, courts could not satisfy their sense of justice with the
consolation that the damages recoverable by the mother would
adequately compensate the child. 59 Following precedent, however,
courts continued to hold that the fetus had no separate existence
under the law, thereby barring recovery for any injury sustained.
B. The Born Alive Rule
Despite the criticism lodged against it, the strict common law
rule survived until 1946, when a federal district court decided
Bonbrest v. Kotz. 60 In Bonbrest, a fetus was injured within the womb
through professional malpractice, but was born alive despite its
injuries. 61 Refuting the precedent set by Justice Holmes, the court
62
declared that the child could recover for these injuries.
The court attacked the prior rule on two grounds. First, it
asserted that a viable fetus and its mother were not one and the same,
55. Id; see also supra Part IV.
56. See Lenow, supra note 30, at 6.
57. E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting)
("Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a period of gestation in
advance of the period of parturition the fetus is capable of independent and separate life, and
that, though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of her body, for her body may
die in all of its parts and the child remain alive, and capable of maintaining life, when separated
from the dead body of the mother. If at that period a child so advanced is injured in its limbs or
members, and is born into the living world suffering from the effects of the injury, is it not
sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but
wholly to the mother?").
58. See Lenow, supra note 30, at 8-9.
59. See id.
60.

65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).

61.
62.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 142.
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pointing out that the viable fetus could, by definition, live
independently of its mother even when it was removed from the womb
after the mother died. 63 Second, the court said that even after the
mother recovered for her personal injuries, there remained "a
residuum of injury for which compensation cannot be had save at the
' '64
suit of the child.
Bonbrest was the beginning of a revolution in tort law as
applied to unborn children. Following that decision, every American
jurisdiction switched from the strict rule articulated by Justice
Holmes to the born alive rule, which declared that a child born alive
could recover for any injury received while in the womb provided that
the injury continued to affect the child after birth. 65 A child who was
born alive but who subsequently died as a result of prenatal injuries,
could recover to the extent allowed by the State's wrongful death
statute.
The creation of the born alive rule was a bold step intended to
adjust the common law that led to an injustice: if a child experienced
an injury only minutes before her birth, the law provided her no
recovery, but if she experienced the same injury only minutes after
she emerged from the womb, the law supported her claim.
Nonetheless, the born alive rule carried its own inequitable
inconsistencies. If a fetus was mortally injured while still in the
womb, delivered barely alive, and died a few moments after birth, her
parents were entitled to recover. 66 But, if the same fetus, after
experiencing the same injury, died only a few moments before
emerging from the birth canal, her parents had no recourse for the
67
loss of their child.
C. The Viability Standard
Only thirteen years after Bonbrest was decided, the restrictions
of the born alive rule were challenged by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Verkennes v. Corniea.6 In Verkennes, an expectant mother
near the end of her term and her child both died because of the

63. Id. at 140.
64. Id. at 141.
65. Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies in
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 935 (1995);
Daniel S. Meade, Wrongful Death and the Unborn Child: Should Viability Be a Prerequisitefor a
Cause of Action?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 421, 430-31 (1998).
66. Meade, supra note 65, at 431.
67. Id.
68. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
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negligence of hospital personnel. 69 The child could have survived
independent of her mother had the doctors taken the proper steps to
deliver it.70 For the same reasons that the Bonbrest court allowed a
child born alive to recover for its prenatal injuries, the court refused to
deny recover solely because the viable fetus had not survived its
71
injuries.
The Verkennes court defined "viability" by reference to a
definition provided by the dissenting opinion in a case that rejected
the concept of recovery for prenatal injury:
[The unborn child] reaches that pre-natal age of viability when the destruction of the life
of the mother does not necessarily end its existence also, and when, if separated
prematurely, and by artificial means from the mother, it would be so far a matured
human being as that it would live and grow, mentally and physically, as other children
generally. 72

This definition of viability largely squares with the concept of fetal
viability in other areas of the law, most notably in the abortion rights
context. 73 In both areas, the fetus is recognized when it can survive
outside of the mother's womb.
D. Problems with the Viability Standard
Like the born alive rule, the viability standard has not been the
panacea that its creators hoped. 74 First, determining when the fetus
has become physically capable of a separate existence is not an exact
science. 75 In cases involving State restrictions on abortion, the United
States Supreme Court has declared that the time during a pregnancy
at which a fetus becomes viable cannot be determined by statute but

69. Id. at 839.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 841. The Verkennes court cited Bonbrest heavily and did not appear to believe it
was disagreeing with its precedent, despite the clear language in Bonbrest indicating that its
holding was limited to children born alive. Id.
72. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (noting that a fetus becomes viable when it is
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid").
74. E.g., Cardwell v. Welch, 213 S.E.2d 382, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the viability
standard in favor of adherence to the born alive rule, noting that "[t]o say, however, as some
courts have, that an action lies for the death if the child was viable at the time of its injury and
death but that no action lies if the child was not yet capable of existing apart from its mother's
womb does not solve but merely relocates the problem"), overruled by Di Donato v. Wortman, 358
S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
75. See GABBE ET AL., supra note 5, at 755-61 (discussing varying fetal survival rates "at the
margins of viability").
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must be determined by a physician in each individual case. 76 State
courts have imported this vagueness into their wrongful death
jurisprudence, where it becomes more consequential.7 7 If the fetus is
fatally injured by the negligence of its treating physician at a
gestational age when viability is in doubt (between 20 and 26 weeks),
the Supreme Court's rule would seem to hinge the legal determination
of the fetus's viability on the medical opinion of the defendant
physician. This would hardly be an optimal source for objective expert
78
testimony.
Second, if a fetus attains viability after it is injured by
defendant's negligence, but before it dies, a court would then be forced
to decide whether a "person" that dies of injuries it received before
becoming a "person" has any cause of action.7 9 Third, if a court
decides that the hypothetical fetus described above has become a
"person" for the purposes of wrongful death recovery, recognizing the
cause of action depends on the occurrence of a condition subsequent.
80
In no other area of tort law are a plaintiffs rights so conditional.
E. The Current State of the Law
The fifty States and the District of Columbia are currently
divided into three basic camps on the issue of whether a person can be
held liable for the wrongful death of the fetus. Twelve States retain
the born alive rule,8 1 thirty-three States and the District of Columbia

76. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Miss. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1976) (noting that
"[t]he time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of
whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible
attending physician").
77. E.g., Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 365 S.E.2d 909, 913.14 (N.C.
1988).
78. See id. While seeming to recognize this problem, the Johnson court was able to avoid it
because the alleged injuries to the fetus continued into the period where its viability was beyond
dispute. Id.
79. See id. ("[Slome portion of defendants' alleged negligence necessarily occurred after
fetal viability was purportedly achieved ....
[PIlaintiffs have therefore sufficiently alleged
defendants breached a duty owed their fetus after it had become viable. Accordingly, we need not
determine whether defendants owed a duty to this fetus prior to its achieving viability or
whether its achieving 'viability' is merely a condition precedent to suit.").
80. Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1096 (Pa. 1985). The condition subsequent criticized
in Amadio was the live birth requirement, but the same logic applies to a requirement of
viability.
81. Jill D. Washburn HeIbling, A State by State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W.
VA. L. REV. 363, 367-71 (1996) (listing Arkansas, California, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia as retaining the born alive rule).
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use the viability standard,8 2 and four States allow recovery for the
83
death of any fetus regardless of whether it was viable or born alive.
84
Wyoming has no case law on the issue.
VI. THE REASONS BEHIND THE VIABILITY STANDARD

Judges and commentators opposing recovery for wrongful
death of fetuses that were nonviable at the time of injury have given a
variety of reasons for such a limitation. These reasons range from
considerations of judicial efficiency and fear of fraud8 5 to concerns
about upsetting the delicate and politically charged balance of fetal
and women's rights.8 6 The diversity of these reasons makes for an
unlikely coalition of interests, pairing businesses opposed to increased
88
tort liability8 7 with abortion rights activists.
To complement their substantive arguments, courts tend to cite
a variety of technical reasons for refusing to extend wrongful death
liability to cover nonviable fetuses. First, in states where wrongful
death statutes indicate only that the representative of any deceased
"person" is eligible for recovery,8 9 courts assert that the definition of
"person" can be derived through statutory interpretation. 90 They then
construe viability as the threshold of personhood, noting that viability
is by definition the point at which the fetus is capable of a separate

82. Id. at 381-421 (listing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin as using the viability standard).
83. Id. at 422-29 (listing Georgia, Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia as allowing
recovery for the death of any fetus regardless of whether it was viable or born alive).
84. Id. at 429.
85. See infra Parts VI.C-VI.E.
86. See infra Parts VI.A-VI.B.
87. See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W. 2d 787, 789 (S.D. 1996) (fetal wrongful
death case where defendant was a corporation that manufactured allegedly adulterated frozen
foods).
88. See NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS LEAGUE, THE "UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT": A
MISGUIDED BILL THAT THREATENS WOMEN'S RIGHTS 2 (2002) (arguing that "[iun states that have
enacted 'fetal protection' legislation by affording legal rights to fetuses, women's rights and
health have been infringed upon significantly").
89. See statutes cited supra note 50.
90. Di Donato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 491 (N.C. 1987); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d
1085, 1098-1101 (Pa. 1985) (holding that a viable fetus not born alive may recover in wrongful
death, but not deciding the applicability of the rule to a nonviable fetus).
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existence. 9 1 At least one court has added that only a viable fetus is
"genetically complete" and "can be taxonomically distinguished from
non-human life forms. 9 2
Courts also frequently add that wrongful death, a creature of
statute, can only be expanded through legislative means. 93 In fact,
two of the four States that have approved a wrongful death award on
behalf of a nonviable fetus have done so because of express statutory
direction. 94 Notably, courts rarely required the same explicit statutory
command when rejecting the born alive rule in favor of the viability
standard. 95
The other technical reason often cited by courts that have
decided to adopt the viability standard is their desire to conform their
state law with the majority of other American jurisdictions, which are
96
now heavily weighted towards recovery for only viable fetuses.
A. Conflict with Abortion Jurisprudence
Allowing recovery only for injuries to a viable fetus is logically
consistent with the constitutional protection of the right to abortion.
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court established that
prior to the point of viability, a State cannot proscribe abortion
because the Court did not consider protecting a nonviable fetus to be a
compelling State interest. 97 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Court reiterated that viability is the point "that the independent
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object
98
of State protection that . . . overrides the rights of the woman."

91. Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Kan. 1990); Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264,
1268 (Md. 1995); Thibert v. Milka, 646 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 (Mass. 1995); Wallace v. Wallace, 421
A.2d 134, 136 (N.H. 1980); Di Donato, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
92. Di Donato, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
93. E.g., Humes, 792 P.2d at 1037; Kandel, 663 A.2d at 1267.
94. Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms,
543 N.W. 2d 787, 790 (S.D. 1996).
95. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 907-09 (Mo. 1983) ("Respondents assert
that this statute must be 'strictly construed' because it is 'in derogation of the common law.' We
do not agree. The wrongful death statute is not, strictly speaking, in 'derogation' of the common
law .... We note that the term 'person' is used in many disparate senses in common speech, in
philosophy, psychology, and in the law; it has no 'plain and ordinary meaning' which we can
apply. The term must therefore be construed in light of the purpose for which this statute was
passed.").
96. Kandel, 663 A.2d at 1267; Di Donato, 358 S.E. 2d at 491 ("Courts construing wrongful
death statutes similar to [North Carolina's statute] generally have concluded that a viable fetus
is among the class of persons contemplated by the statute's authors.").
97. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
98. 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
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Courts have listed the preservation of this consistency as a primary
reason for denying wrongful death damages for unborn children. 99
Some courts seek consistency between recognizing fetal rights
and recognizing a right to recover for fetal injuries solely to enhance
simplicity and fairness. Feminist scholars fear that inconsistencies,
once established, could be used to erode existing abortion rights. 10 0
They argue that inclusion of fetuses within the protection of wrongful
death law begins to establish fetal constitutional rights, which could
become powerful enough to outweigh a woman's right to privacy.101
B. Unintended Consequences for Other Liberties of Pregnant Women

Feminist activists also fear that laws providing additional legal
protection to fetuses could have the effect of curbing the freedoms of
pregnant women outside of the abortion context.
For example,
protection of nonviable fetuses could "encourage civil claims against
1°2
[mothers] for negligent in utero care" that leads to a miscarriage.
Similarly, businesses, if exposed to liability for injured fetuses, will
limit this risk by restricting their interactions with pregnant
10 3
women.
99. Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 303-04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) ("If the mother can
intentionally terminate the pregnancy at three months, without regard to the rights of the fetus,
it becomes increasingly difficult to justify holding a third person liable to the fetus for
unknowingly and unintentionally, but negligently, causing the pregnancy to end at that same
stage."); see also Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1268 (Md. 1995); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d
134, 137 (N.H. 1980).
100. See, e.g., Wendy C. Shapero, Comment, Does a Non-viable Fetus's Right To Bring a
Wrongful Death Action Endanger a Woman's Right to Choose?, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 325, 342-46
(1997).
101. Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade,
62 ALA. L. REV. 999, 1014 (1999) ("[Provisions allowing] fetuses to be covered as 'persons' for
purposes of civil wrongful death statutes. . . [were] actively supported by anti-choice lobbyists
who understood their potential as a tool for ultimately overturning Roe v. Wade ... [and] create
an environment in which prosecutions of pregnant women seem reasonable and the right to
abortion does not."); see also Shapero, supra note 100, at 337 ("The concept of fetal rights is a
development by attorneys working for anti-abortion organizations ....
The danger in recognizing
fetal rights prior to viability is that a fetus, which cannot survive independently from its mother,
obtains judicial support to demand that the mother make all decisions regarding her body for the
benefit of the fetus.").
102. Shapero, supra note 100, at 350; see also V. Dion Haynes, Homicide Laws and the
Unborn, THE TENNESSEAN, May 11, 2003, at 19A (" 'If we allow batterers to be charged with
homicide against a fetus, [law enforcement may] charge a battered woman with negligence for
having been in that relationship in the first place' said Juley Fulcher, public policy director of the
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence.").
103. NAT'L ABORTION RIGHTS LEAGUE, supra note 88, at 2 (noting that "[flor example...
gyms might refuse to allow pregnant women to work out, fearing that any miscarriage would be
attributable to them. Very quickly, pregnant women could become 'protected' in a cage of
restrictive rules fashioned in response to so-called 'fetal protection' laws").
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C. Desire to Curb the Expansion of Tort
Courts have also expressed reluctance to allow recovery for the
death of nonviable fetuses because of a perceived need to check "the
never-ending effort to widen more and more the circle of liability
which surrounds us."'1 04 Adherence to the viability standard provides
a convenient bright line marking the point at which a fetus becomes
an entity with legal rights. 10 5 The viability line appears particularly
bright both because it has precedent in another area of law, 10 6 and
because it seems very reasonable to assign legal existence
independent of the mother to the fetus at the time when it becomes a
theoretical possibility for the fetus to have an actual existence
10 7
independent from the mother.
The relatively rapid adoption and discard of both the strict
standard and the born alive rule, with each new rule bringing an
additional class of cases into court, gives legitimate cause to fear a
slippery slope. Left totally unrestrained, the circle of liability could
ultimately expand to the point where even the bright line of
conception would be breached. 0 8 Though this may seem far fetched,
consider that courts have already held that liability can arise from
damage done to a preconception sperm or egg which results in injury
to a child that is born alive. 09 Particularly at a time when medical
malpractice judgments and ensuing malpractice insurance premiums
threaten to bankrupt physicians who practice in the area of prenatal
care,1 10 it is understandable that judges would wish to halt any
further expansion of legal duty.

104. Wallace, 421 A.2d at 136; see also Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1101 (Pa. 1985) (Nix,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing against extending wrongful death coverage to any fetus).
105. See, e.g., Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194, 196 (N.M. 1995).
106. See supra Part VI.A (describing use of viability standard in abortion law).
107. Miller, 905 P.2d at 196 ("Only a viable fetus is capable of an independent existence, and
therefore it should be regarded as a separate entity capable of maintaining an action in its own
right."). But see Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 792 (S.D. 1996) (calling
viability "purely an arbitrary milestone from which to reckon a child's legal existence").
108. See Lenow, supra note 30, at 8. One can, albeit with difficulty, imagine a situation
where this might occur. For instance, Jack and Jill attempt to conceive a child but fail because
Jill has been rendered temporarily infertile by a chemical to which she was negligently exposed
by Company X. Before the chemical wears off, Jack is killed in an unrelated event. The woman
then might attempt to sue Company X for the wrongful "death" of the potential fetus that Jack
and Jill would otherwise have created.
109. A. Edward Doudera, Fetal Rights? It Depends, TRIAL, Apr. 1982, at 38, 43 (citing
Jorgensen v. Meade-Johnson Labs., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973)).
110. Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Nation's
Obstetrical Care Endangered by Growing Liability Insurance Crisis (May. 6, 2002)
http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/press-releases/nrO5-06-02- 1.cfm
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D. The Problem of Proving Causation
Yet another problem cited by courts that have been reluctant to
expand wrongful death liability for fetuses is the difficulty of proving
causation.'1 1 As a general matter, the actual physical cause of death
is not often in doubt when a born person is killed. If the cause is not
immediately obvious from viewing the body, an autopsy can be
performed. A fetus, to the contrary, is often miscarried for reasons not
ascertainable. 112 At least one court has recognized that, prior to
113
viability, determining the cause of death is particularly difficult.
Before viability it is more likely both that there will be a
15
miscarriage"14 and that the miscarriage will be unexplainable.1
Further, even when it can be proven that a fetal death was
caused by the negligence of a third party, there is no way of proving
that the pregnancy would not have terminated for another reason
regardless of the third party's actions. 11 6
This uncertainty is
compounded if wrongful death protection is extended to nonviable
fetuses. Since nonviable fetuses are more susceptible to spontaneous
termination' 1 7 and have a longer period before birth than viable
fetuses, it is more likely that a nonviable fetus would not have
survived to birth if the third party had not acted.
E. The Problem of ProvingInjury
Courts must also be concerned that an expansion of wrongful
death coverage to nonviable fetuses could increase the risk of juries
compensating a nonexistent harm.11 8 In almost every American
111. See Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 216 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa. 1965) (requiring live
birth), overruled by Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985).
112. See 5B LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES

§ 37.6c (Richard M. Patterson, ed., 4th ed. 1998).
113. Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 62 (Mo. 1990) (superseded by statute).
114. GABBE ET AL., supra note 5, at 748.
115. 5B LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 112, § 37.6c.

116. This is different from when an adult is killed by someone else's negligence. Even if the
adult died a year later of natural causes, the negligence would still have deprived the adult of a
year of life. The fetus, which otherwise would have miscarried three months later in the
pregnancy, is deprived of nothing more than two months in a non-aware, almost vegetative state.
The parents of the fetus are deprived of three months of pregnancy, but if the ultimate result is
still miscarriage, this is probably not much of an injury either. Given the choice between
miscarrying at four months or miscarrying at seven months, most parents would probably find
the earlier miscarriage easier to deal with emotionally.
117. See supranote 114 and accompanying text.
118. See Coveleski v. Bubnis, 571 A.2d 433, 435 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("Before viability, any
determination of damages for death of the fetus would be entirely speculative. Whether the child
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family, children constitute a net financial loss for their parents. The
real injury that demands compensation is the emotional loss suffered
by the parents.
For some expectant parents, the emotional or
psychological loss suffered through a miscarriage or stillbirth can
approach that suffered by parents who lose a born child. 119
When the terminated fetus is viable, the pregnancy has
progressed to the point where society generally finds it believable that

the parents have experienced a significant emotional loss. 1 20

For a

nonviable fetus, this belief becomes harder to sustain. The frequency
of early term miscarriages has conditioned prospective parents to be
emotionally cautious in the early weeks of the pregnancy.1 21 When a
pregnancy is involuntarily terminated in the early, nonviable stage, it
is less likely that the prospective parents have become attached to
their fetus in a way that will cause psychological pain if the pregnancy
does not come to fruition.122
Further, during the nonviable stage of a pregnancy, a woman
may not even be aware that she is pregnant. If a pregnancy is lost at
this stage, courts might rightly be concerned about a woman
opportunistically suing on behalf of an unborn child that she did not
know she had until after it was gone. Most troubling of all, one can
envision a situation where a woman intending to procure an abortion
experienced some trauma beforehand that spontaneously terminated
her pregnancy. If this woman were to sue on behalf of her lost fetus,

would be born healthy and talented would be incapable of prediction with reasonable certainty.");
Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 67, 71 (R.I. 1991) ("Adoption of the rule advocated by
plaintiff would give rise to actions based upon speculation and conditions wherein predictability
would be virtually nonexistent.").
119. See Hazelanne Lewis, Effects and Implications of a Stillbirth or Other PerinatalDeath,
in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PREGNANCY, BIRTHING, AND BONDING 321 (Barbara L. Blum ed.,
1980) ("[F]or some parents the stillbirth can remain the most important event of their life."). In
addition to the grief and disappointment that would be expected, parents of children that die in
utero often experience damage to their self-esteem. Id. at 315 ("A stillbirth is frequently
experienced as having failed in a basic human function, that of reproduction, and leads to
feelings of inadequacy as a person."). Also, they must often go through the immensely saddening
experience of temporarily carrying and then delivering a dead baby. Id. at 310-11.
120. See Recent Development, O'Neill v. Morse, Torts-Wrongful Death-Unborn Child, 70
MICH. L. REV. 729, 746 (1972) [hereinafter Recent Development] ("[T]he companionship of an
unborn child is felt by the family, psychologically as well as physically. This is particularly true
after quickening, and to this extent it seems probable that recovery would be higher for fetal loss
later in pregnancy than earlier.").
121. See supra note 114 and accompanying text; cf. ARTHUR D. COLMAN & LIBBY LEE
COLMAN, PREGNANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE 43 (1971) ("The second trimester,
months four through six, is [sic] called the quiet months. The threat of abortion (miscarriage) is
generally over.")
122 See Kristen R.C. Goldbach et al., The Effects of GestationalAge and Gender on Grief
After Pregnancy Loss, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 461, 465 (1991).
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justice would be offended by providing her with a financial award, yet
the defendant would have a difficult time offering proof as to her
intentions.
F. Ability to Compensate the Wrong Through Other Routes of Liability
Finally, judges have justified denying recovery for nonviable
fetuses by claiming that the wrong done to the fetus can be
compensated by damages awarded to the mother for injuries she
suffered personally during the same incident that injured the fetus.
Because the fetus is encased inside the body of the mother, it is almost
impossible to injure the fetus without also injuring the mother
personally.123 For instance, if a fetus is killed because of a car
accident involving the mother, or because the mother ingests an
adulterated food product, the mother will most likely be able to
complain of a physical injury in her own right. Additionally, most
States allow a mother who has been injured in a way that terminates
her pregnancy to recover for the mental anguish that the miscarriage
causes her. 124
Personal recovery for the mother helps to ensure that a
negligent defendant will not escape having to pay for his actions, and
that the mother will not have to endure the loss of her unborn child
without receiving any compensation. Moreover, since the amount of
damages for elements like pain and suffering is necessarily
unscientific, we might expect that a jury award for personal injuries to
a woman who has lost a pregnancy because of an accident will be
higher than the award for a similarly injured woman who has not lost
a pregnancy.

123. Wallace, 421 A.2d at 136 (noting that "[recovery for death of a fetus] would be in
addition to the cause of action the prospective mother has for her injuries"); Amadio v. Levin, 501
A.2d 1085, 1102 (Pa. 1985) (Nix, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that only fetuses born alive should be
allowed to recover because "[a]ny trauma to the child en ventre sa mere is a trauma to the body of
the mother carrying that child, which can be claimed in an action by that mother in her own
right"); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W. 2d 787, 795 (S.D. 1996) (Amundson, J.,
dissenting) ("It is important to note that Mother still may have numerous causes of action for the
loss she personally sustained from this orderal.")
124. Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for
Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 460-72 (1978).
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VII. MEDICAL PERSONNEL SHOULD HAVE A DUTY TO UNBORN
CHILDREN WHEN THEY PIERCE THE WOMB WITH THE SOLE INTENT OF

BENEFITING THE CHILD, REGARDLESS OF VIABILITY

The best reasons for prohibiting wrongful death recovery for
nonviable unborn children are not applicable in the fetal surgery
context. A separate standard should be created.
A. Policy Reasons for the Expansion of Duty
The policy reasons for creating a duty from fetal surgeons to
the unborn children they treat are not difficult to discern. First,
surgeons always have an elevated duty to their patients. 125 While we
all have a duty to avoid negligently causing harm to others, surgeons
have an affirmative duty to use their skills to help those patients
whom they undertake to treat. 126 When a surgeon treats a pregnant
woman, the law does not necessarily impose a duty on him to care for
her fetus. 127 To the contrary, in many situations the surgeon must
sacrifice the fetus to save the life of the mother. But, when the mother
is not in need of medical care and the surgeon agrees to perform
surgery for the sole benefit of the mother's unborn child, it simply
makes sense that the surgeon should have the same duty to his
unborn patient as she would to any other patient.
If surgeons had no such legal duty to the fetus, some surgeons
might be encouraged to act carelessly toward fetuses. For the vast
majority of physicians, professionalism and compassion alone will
ensure that all patients, born and unborn alike, receive careful
treatment. For the small minority of physicians that would fall short
of the standards established by professionalism and compassion, the
imposition of a legal duty would reduce the risk that fetal patients
would be injured due to unnecessarily risky experimentation,
incompetence, or even malice. 128
The fact that surgeons are aware of the existence of the fetus
provides further support for the fetal surgery standard. This is often
not true in fetal tort cases. The negligent driver who runs into a
125. Donna H. Smith, Note, Increased Risk of Harm:A New Standardfor Sufficiency of
Evidence of Causationin Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U.L. REV. 275, 297-98 (1985).
126. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).
127. See supra Part V.E.
128. One of the battles currently raging in the fetal surgery debate is whether adequate
attention is being paid to the significant health consequences of fetal surgery for mothers. See
CASPER, supra note 4, at 201-03. To the extent that a legal responsibility for the life of the fetus
discourages overambitious or unscrupulous fetal surgeries, the life and health of mothers will be
protected as well.
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pregnant woman and the negligent food producer who poisons her will
likely have no idea that they stand to injure an unborn child. Even
the emergency physician who is suddenly called upon to treat a
pregnant woman may be unaware that a fetus exists within her.
Since the fetal surgeon will always have notice that his negligent
actions could harm the fetus as well as the mother, he will be better
able to guard against negligence, and to refuse to perform surgery if
the risk of liability seems too great.
Finally, to borrow a phrase from another area of law, the
imposition of a duty from fetal surgeons to every fetus they treat
vindicates the "investment-backed expectations" 129 of the mothers that
agree to undergo fetal surgery. This investment is not only monetary,
but also comes in the form of the pain and personal risk that a mother
incurs when a procedure is attempted. A mother can reasonably
expect neither success, nor even that her unborn child will not be
worse off for having undergone the surgery. These mothers should
reasonably expect, however, that fetal surgeries will be performed
with the level of care exercised by reputable physicians practicing
Once fetal surgery becomes a more
under similar conditions.
established practice, mothers who choose it should reasonably expect
that it will be performed with the diligence and skill that has become
the norm for fetal surgery. The imposition of a duty from fetal
surgeons to fetuses guards these reasonable expectations, albeit only
with monetary compensation.
B. PracticalLimits on Expansion
If there is to be a special standard for fetal deaths resulting
from fetal surgery, there must be a precise definition of what
constitutes fetal surgery. Without such a clear delineation, the special
standard could become just one more step along a slippery slope
toward unlimited liability.
For the purpose of assigning liability in wrongful death law,
"person" should include a fetus at any stage of development if the
surgeon defendant has intentionally pierced the uterus surrounding
the fetus with the intention of improving the health or saving the life
of the fetus, and without the intention of improving the health or
saving the life of the mother.

129. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978) (using the phrase
"investment-backed expectations" to describe the predicament of landowners who become unable
to use their property as they had intended when the government imposes additional land use
regulations).
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This definition clearly excludes abortion providers, as well as
any doctor who might compromise a pregnancy in order to preserve
the health of the mother. It includes endoscopic as well as open
surgeries.
It also includes the more conventional procedure of
130
amniocentisis.
Despite the good policy reasons that support it, State courts are
still likely to be uncomfortable with instituting the fetal surgery
standard without some legislative direction. Therefore, State
legislatures should incorporate the definition given above into their
wrongful death statutes.
VIII. WRONGFUL DEATH IN THE FETAL SURGERY CONTEXT: A SPECIAL
CASE

The reasons presented in Part VI for prohibiting wrongful
death recovery for nonviable fetuses vary significantly in validity.
Several are simply misguided. Others are legitimate, and make the
viability standard seem a superior alternative to unrestricted fetal
death liability.
However, even the legitimate reasons are not
applicable when a wrongful death action is brought because of alleged
negligence that takes place during fetal surgery.
A. Justice Does Not Require That Wrongful Death and Abortion Rights
Be Consistent in Their Treatment of the Fetus
The use of the abortion analogy has received criticism from
both judges and commentators who allege that it is an illogical
comparison.131
First, these critics note that Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Roe v. Wade specifically mentioned State laws that
permitted parents of a stillborn child to recover in wrongful death, and
132
did not find these laws to be inconsistent with the Roe holding.
Second, the critics point out that the Roe decision was intended to
balance a woman's right to privacy with the State's interest in
protecting potential life. 133 Wrongful death suits focus on third party
defendants and in no way infringe on a pregnant woman's privacy. 134
130. This is an unintended consequence, but not an undesirable one. See Tebbutt v.
Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a mother could not recover following
the death of her unborn child after a negligently performed amniocentesis).
131. See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790 (S.D. 1996); Meade, supra note
65, at 444-45. But see Klasing, supra note 65, at 977-79 (arguing that the definition of person
must be consistent between wrongful death law and abortion law).
132. Meade, supra note 65, at 444-45.
133. Id. at 445.
134. Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 791.
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In addition, it is relevant that wrongful death suits technically
do not bear on the State's interest in potential life that was at issue in
Roe. The State vindicates its interests through the criminal law and
certain civil cases where the State acts as the plaintiff. The interests
vindicated in a wrongful death suit are the parents' interests in the
potential life of the fetus, and arguably the interest of the fetus itself
in being protected from fatal injuries. 135 Therefore, since one side of
the Roe balancing test is not implicated, the precedent is simply not
relevant. 136
The supposed need for verbal consistency of treatment between
different bodies of law is belied by the way our legal system treats
corporations. Like a nonviable fetus, a corporation can be terminated
by its owners and managers without any legal repercussion. 137 This
does not mean, however, that a corporation must be utterly without
legal rights. On the contrary, a corporation can sue for damages if a
third party breaks a contract with it or otherwise treats it unfairly.
Analytically, this inconsistency is little different than allowing a
nonviable fetus to be terminated by its mother while protecting it from
torts perpetrated by the outside world.
Kayhan Parsi has explained the inconsistent treatment of
fetuses between different bodies of law with what she calls the "cipher
metaphor." 138 Under the cipher metaphor, "the fetus has no inherent
status, but only what is conferred on it."'139 Under this theory, society
can easily recognize the fetus as a legal entity in the wrongful death
context solely to vindicate the value that the parents have attached to
it.
The related concerns of those abortion rights activists who fear
that wrongful death tort law is an "end-run" around the holdings of
Roe and Casey140 are also misplaced. First, it is notable that wrongful
death liability for the fetus and criminalization of abortion have rarely
135. Recent Development, supra note 120, at 746; see also O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904,
909 (Mo. 1983) ("Parents clearly have an interest in being protected against or compensated for
the loss of the child they wish to have. The fetus itself has an interest in being protected from
injury before birth. It follows logically that it should be protected against fatal injuries as well.")
(citation omitted).
136. See Recent Development, supra note 120, at 746-47 ("The abortion issue involves the
resolution of the mother's rights as against the child's when the two are in conflict. Whatever
may be the determination of the rights in that contest, this special relation gives a third-party
tortfeasor no comparable rights."), quoted in O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910; Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d
at 791.
137. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (2002).

138. Kayhan Parsi, MetaphoricalImagination: The Moral and Legal Statutes of Fetuses and
Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703, 725-26 (1999).

139. Id. at 725.
140. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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traveled together. In fact, an attempted abortion was a crime at the
same time Justice Holmes was reiterating that the fetus had no right
141
to recover for injuries caused by third parties.
Second, the abortion rights movement is ultimately concerned
with allowing women to make their own choices about whether to
continue a pregnancy. To be sure, this goal is infringed by State laws
that proscribe or unduly burden the choice to have an abortion. But
reproductive autonomy is also infringed by private third party
negligence that forces an involuntary termination. To the extent that
aggressive application of tort law deters such third party negligence, it
can serve to promote rather than deter reproductive freedom.
Expanded fetal coverage in wrongful death law is supported by
members of the pro-life movement who hope that it will encourage
Americans to think of fetuses as people thereby engendering
opposition to abortion. 142 But, a wrongful death jurisprudence that
values the fetus only as a cipher, only to the extent that it was valued
by its carrier, is unlikely to transfer any societal value to the fetus as
an entity. As a society, we already differentiate between the emotion
we attach to the spontaneously lost fetus that is missed by its parents
and the aborted fetus that is not. There is no reason that the law
43
cannot be sophisticated enough to reflect this distinction.'

141. Compare Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 32 N.E. 910 (Mass. 1893) (affirming conviction for
attempting to procure the miscarriage of a woman), with Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (holding that there is no cause of action for fetal injuries
caused by negligence).
142. See Klasing, supra note 65, at 978-79 ("It is... unlikely that a frontal attack on the
right to abortion will succeed ....
How then may we seek protection for the unborn? Those who
seek a uniform definition of "person" that places proper value on an unborn child should begin to
focus more on wrongful death law.... Only when the public is changed, will the United States
Supreme Court change.").
143. Several scholars have stressed that judges and lawyers should make this distinction
more clear. See Elizabeth S. Brown, Note, Constitutional Considerations Underlie Missouri's
Expansion of Fetal Rights Within its Wrongful Death Statute: Connor v. Monk, 61 MO. L. REV.
473, 485 (1996) ("Lawmakers need not view their options as either labeling the fetus a person or
denying its existence. By identifying the survivors as the focus of the statutorily created
wrongful death action rather than the fetus, lawmakers could achieve the purposes of the statute
while avoiding a threat to women's autonomy. The effect of a wrongful death action emanating
from the survivors would continue to compensate parents for the loss of their expected child and
protect the interest of a woman who has chosen to carry her pregnancy to term."); accord
Shapero, supra note 100, at 350-51. While clarity of purpose in this area would be desireable, to
state explicitly that the action focuses on the survivors to some degree merely states the obvious.
In any wrongful death action, it is the survivors and not the deceased who appear in court, and
the survivors and not the deceased who stand to benefit from any judgment.
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B. Expanding Wrongful Death Liability in Fetal Surgery Cases Would
Not Undermine Pregnant Women's Liberties
The contention that the imposition of a general duty of care for
nonviable fetuses would result in private businesses closing their
doors to pregnant women is not compelling when applied to fetal
surgery. In this context, the argument would have to be that the
additional liability risk imposed by creating a duty to the nonviable
fetus would discourage surgeons from performing fetal surgeries, and
therefore decrease women's access to these types of procedures. This
is not compelling for several reasons. First, a woman's right to have
fetal surgery is not an issue at the forefront of the women's rights
movement. On the contrary, modern feminists tend to be much more
concerned with a woman's right to avoid having fetal surgery forced
upon her by the State. 144 Feminists might also worry that social and
family pressure could induce a woman to undergo surgery with which
she was not comfortable in order to benefit her fetus. For these
reasons, a change in the tort law that made fetal surgery slightly less
common might not be a bad thing from a feminist perspective.
Second, today's fetal surgeons are already protected from
liability by the necessary negligence elements of breach and
causation.1 45
These doctors are unlikely to be dissuaded from
performing procedures that put them at the forefront of medical
science by a small increase in potential liability.1 46 If, in spite of these
protections, the threat of additional damages for a lost fetus is enough
to discourage a doctor from performing a fetal surgery, perhaps that is
a good indication that he or she should not perform the procedure all.
In this manner, the tort system would help to ensure that fetal
surgeries are channeled to those surgeons most capable of success,
and that overly ambitious procedures will not be performed.
C. Expanding Liability in Fetal Surgery Would Retain ClearLimits on
the Expansion of Tort
Recovery could be allowed for nonviable fetuses lost during
fetal surgeries without sliding down the slippery slope of pervasive
liability. In fact, determining whether a fetal death resulted from a
surgery solely intended to benefit the fetus is both more sensible and
144. Newkirk, supra note 15. Even voluntary fetal surgery makes some pro-choice feminists
nervous because of its tendency to personify the fetus. See CASPER, supra note 4, at 13.
145. See supra Part III.
146. These surgeons already operate despite enormous potential liability for harm that
might befall the mother during the procedure.
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easier to ascertain than deciding whether the fetus was viable when it
was lost.
Courts have commended viability as a sensible standard in
wrongful death law because of the supposed legal significance of the
point where the fetus is able to exist separately outside of the
womb. 147 This standard has several weaknesses.
The practical
difficulty with determining the actual point that an individual fetus
has become viable has already been described. 148 Leaving aside the
difficulties of application, a viable fetus in truth has no more
capability for a separate existence than a nonviable fetus. Both are
completely encased by the body of another person. Out of the womb,
both would certainly die if actually left alone to fend for themselves.
The fact that some level of intense medical attention would keep the
heart of the viable fetus beating seems an odd distinction on which to
base legal recovery.149
The fetal surgery standard is more sensible because it
considers factors important to the law's motivation for providing a
wrongful death remedy. The major consequence of a judgment that a
defendant is liable for the wrongful death of a fetus will be the
payment of compensation to the parents. Therefore, it makes sense to
use a standard that helps to indicate whether the parents have
suffered a compensable loss. When a mother has decided to undergo a
dangerous and painful surgery in an effort to benefit her unborn child,
she likely has a strong emotional attachment to the fetus. The
existence of a strong emotional attachment shows that the loss of this
particular fetus, viable or not, is a loss of no small significance that
tort law should justly recognize.
Further, in contrast to the viability standard, the fetal surgery
standard is easy to apply in a particular case. The court need only ask
two questions to determine if the fetal surgery standard is met,
neither prone to much ambiguity. First, did the surgeon pierce the
uterus of the woman while she was pregnant? Second, was the sole
purpose of the operation to benefit the fetus? If the answer to both of
these questions is yes, the fetal surgery standard is met, and the
defendant had a duty to the fetus.
147. Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1268 (Md. 1995); Thibert v. Milka, 646 N.E.2d 1025,
1026 (Mass. 1995); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 136 (N.H. 1980).
148. See supratext accompanying notes 74-80.
149. Even in the abortion context, where the viability standard originated, the Supreme
Court has conceded that viability is a somewhat arbitrary point of reference.
Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992). The court maintained that it was necessary to
pick such a point in order to balance the competing interest of the woman and the State. Id. at
871. There is nothing inherently fair about the point of viability that justifies its exportation to
other bodies of law where there is not the same need for compromise.
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Because the fetal surgery standard is both sensible and easily
ascertainable, it is not likely to lead to the limitless expansion of tort
that courts have feared when adhering to the viability standard. To
the contrary, the fetal surgery standard covers so few cases that it
cannot alone replace the viability standard. But as a complement to
the viability standard, the fetal surgery standard would be a
measured expansion of liability with a clear line of limitation.
D. The Problem of Proving Causationis Less Severe in the Fetal
Surgery Context
As in any fetal wrongful death case, a court in a fetal surgery
wrongful death suit must struggle with the problem of whether the
allegedly negligent actions of the defendant actually caused the death
of the fetus. However, the monitoring that takes place both before and
during fetal surgery makes this problem easier to address.
Candidates for fetal surgery must be screened prior to the procedure,
and during the procedure the actions of the surgeon are closely
watched.150
While this information may not be dispositive of causation in
all cases, it should often be helpful in determining whether the
defendant's breach directly led to the death of the fetus.
More difficult, however, is determining whether, even if a
botched fetal surgery had been successful, the pregnancy would have
Scholars who
terminated later in term for unrelated reasons.
generally oppose the viability standard assert that this consideration
should be irrelevant, as 'it is not the privilege of him whose wrongful
act caused the loss to hide behind the uncertainties inherent in the
very situation his wrong has created." '151 This argument has some
merit, but the frequency of miscarriages while the fetus is not viable
If it were ignored, a significant number of
cannot be ignored.
plaintiffs would receive a windfall and fetal surgeries would be
overdeterred.
Here again, the preoperative scrutiny to which fetal surgery
candidates are subject will help to identify those cases that are most
likely to be windfalls. 15 2 If the scrutiny reveals that a fetus suffers
from some ailment that tends to cause miscarriages, one in addition to

150. See CASPER, supra note 4, at 81-89 (detailing use of ultrasound before and during fetal
surgery).
151. Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J. LEGAL
MED. 99, 113 (1992) (quoting Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Mich. 1960)).
152. See CASPER, supra note 4, at 81-89 (detailing use of ultrasound before and during fetal
surgery).

2003]

FETAL SURGERYAND WRONGFUL DEATH

1553

the problem that the surgery is intended to treat, it seems unlikely
that a fetal surgeon would attempt an operation at all. If a surgeon
did conduct the procedure, there would be solid evidence that a
spontaneous termination in the months ahead was more likely than in
the average case. Courts could use this evidence either to reduce the
parents' recovery in proportion to the likelihood of spontaneous
termination, or to prohibit recovery entirely when the other ailment
causes miscarriages more often than not.153
Admittedly, the fetal surgery standard does not resolve the
In each case where the preoperative
latter causation problem.
scrutiny reveals no evidence of problems likely to cause stillbirth or
miscarriage, the defendant surgeon may still argue that the fetus was
as likely to experience a spontaneous termination as any other healthy
fetus. But, the viability standard is not a perfect solution in this
regard either, since even a viable fetus faces some risk of spontaneous
termination. Only the increasingly disfavored born alive rule can
guarantee that no plaintiff will recover unless the fetus was destined
to come to term. Like the viability standard, the fetal surgery
standard would simply forge a compromise, allowing a few windfall
recoveries in order to protect the recovery of the greater number that
genuinely deserve compensation.
E. The Problem of ProvingInjury Is Solved in the Fetal Surgery
Context
Perhaps the best advantage provided by the fetal surgery
standard is its inherent ability to solve the problem of proving injury.
As noted above, judges in a conventional fetal wrongful death case
may worry that the mother seeking compensation is an opportunistic
plaintiff who either had no idea she was pregnant before the
miscarriage occurred, or was planning to have an abortion. In such a
case, recovery would compensate for a harm that never occurred.
The fetal surgery standard avoids this problem. As long as the
election of fetal surgery remains a free choice, courts can be almost
sure that any pregnant woman who chooses the surgery has formed
enough of a bond with her unborn child to be affected by losing her
child. It simply defies reason to assert that a mother who volunteers

153. Courts use each of these approaches when faced with born persons who have lost a
chance to survive an ailment because of physician negligence. Compare Roberts v. Ohio
Permanente Med. Group, 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996) (allowing for damages in
proportion to the lost chance for survival), with Dykes v. William Beaumont Hosp., 633 N.W.2d
440, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (prohibiting any damages when the plaintiff did not have a chance
of survival exceeding fifty percent).
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to put her own health at risk, as well as tolerate at least a modicum of
pain and suffering,154 solely to benefit the fetus, has not formed
significant emotional attachment.' 55
F. The Unique Nature of Fetal Surgery Makes it Unlikely that Injuries
to the Fetus Will Be Compensated By DamagesAwarded to the Mother
for Her Own Injuries
Finally, the consolation offered by some courts-that the mother
who is denied an award for the loss of her nonviable fetus will be
compensated by the judgment she receives for her own injuries-does
not carry the same weight when fetal surgery is involved. The botched
fetal surgery, unlike the more traditional car accident or incident of
food poisoning, can easily leave the mother unscathed but the fetus
terminated. In fact, fetal surgery is virtually the only context in
which the tortfeasor could negligently injure the fetus without
negligently injuring the mother.
While it is true that some
jurisdictions allow a mother to recover for mental anguish when her
pregnancy is terminated because of another's negligence, tort law's
traditional hostility to emotional distress claims has made this cause
of action rather unreliable. 156 Courts often require that the mother
have personally sustained some accompanying physical injury, or at
least have been aware of the injury to the fetus at the time it
occurred.157 Even when a cause of action for mental anguish is
allowed, courts have limited recovery to damages incurred in the
immediacy of the incident, therefore excluding compensation for long
term loss of society and companionship. 5 8

154. Knopoff, supra note 15, at 527 (detailing risks and drawbacks to woman with regard to
fetal surgery).
155. It does not necessarily follow from this argument that a woman's election of fetal
surgery should create a duty on the part of everyone to her nonviable fetus. Her election only
guarantees an emotional bond at the time of the surgery. Afterwards, she may begin to feel
differently about the fetus, particularly if the surgery is unsuccessful in repairing a serious
defect. If she changes her mind while the fetus is still not viable, she may decide to have an
abortion. In this situation, courts must again worry that conventional negligence causing
miscarriage may inflict no emotional injury worthy of compensation.
156. E.g., Styles v. Y.D. Taxi Corp., 426 So. 2d 1144, 1144-45 (Fla. 1983) (requiring objective
signs of personal injury); Big Sandy & C.R. Co. v. Blankenship, 118 S.W.316, 318-19 (Ky. 1909)
(requiring personal injury); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (N.Y. 1985) (requiring
either personal injury or contemporaneous observation).
157. E.g., Styles, 426 So. 2d at 1144-45 (requiring objective signs of personal injury); Big
Sandy & C.R. Co., 118 S.W. at 318-19 (requiring personal injury); Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143
(requiring either personal injury or contemporaneous observation).
158. E.g., Big Sandy, 118 S.W. at 317-18 ("Any injured feelings following the miscarriage,
not part of the pain naturally attending it, are too remote to be considered an element of damage.
If the plaintiff lamented the loss of her offspring, such grief involves too much an element of
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CONCLUSION

The bitter controversy that exists in America over the moral
existence of a fetus inevitably means that there will be no easy
answers when courts attempt to define the legal status of the fetus.
Wrongful death law has repeatedly stumbled in trying to address this
problem. This Note offers no innovative solution to the problem as a
whole. Instead, it merely identifies a small sliver of cases that can be
separated from the rest and dealt with separately. By isolating the
category of fetal surgery within wrongful death law, States can allow
recovery for nonviable fetuses without worrying about problems of
proof or windfall judgments for nonexistent injuries.
While the number of litigants affected by the absence of the
fetal surgery standard may at present be small, recognizing a duty as
proposed in this Note will ensure that the protection it affords will
exist when fetal surgery becomes both more feasible and more
popular. If States wait until the courts are encountering fetal surgery
negligence cases more regularly, judges will be forced to choose
between continuing to deny recovery or applying the new rules
retroactively to medical personnel who had no prior notice of their
liability. State legislatures should promptly amend their wrongful
death statutes to allow recovery when, during a nonexperimental fetal
surgery, the surgeon's negligence causes the death of the fetus.
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